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Selling Assets Free and Clear of an Interest in Property
Under § 363(f): An Examination of the TWA and
Chrysler Bankruptcies and Successor Liability Issues
John A. Nasr*
When a business files a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code), it is frequently the case that multiple
creditors present claims, sometimes competing claims, against the
property of the debtor. For example, a debtor that is engaged in man-
ufacturing goods, such as widgets, very likely has machinery and other
industrial equipment that are essential to the production process. It is
also likely that the debtor's machinery, equipment, and perhaps the
factory itself are encumbered by competing interests of different cred-
itors. Some creditors will possess properly perfected secured claims
against specific pieces of property, such as the machinery and equip-
ment required to produce the widgets or the finished widgets them-
selves. On the other hand, some creditors are unsecured and will
assert general claims against the company itself. When secured credi-
tors fight amongst each other (and with the throng of unsecured credi-
tors) for the limited assets of a failing business, the potential for a
contentious and protracted bankruptcy is obvious. Perhaps more im-
portantly, the business debtor often has at least some assets that are
valuable and attractive to potential purchasers, but these potential
purchasers are often wary, and rightfully so, of acquiring assets that
are either encumbered or subject to an adversary proceeding within a
bankruptcy case, or both. Indeed, few things reduce the value of
property like the prospect of contentious and prolonged litigation.
Both the debtor and its creditors want to maximize the value of the
property being sold-maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate
is, after all, one of the few shared goals between the debtor and its
creditors. Fortunately, § 363(f) of the Code permits a debtor to sell
property "free and clear of any interest" in such property, despite the
fact that multiple creditors may have adverse and competing interests
* Attorney at Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C. in Phoenix, Arizona. The author would like to express
his sincere appreciation to the Honorable Randolph J. Haines, United States Bankruptcy Judge
for the District of Arizona, for his encouragement and editorial assistance. The author would
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in the property.' Section 363(f) provides a potentially elegant solution
in the commercial creditor arena when all of the claims and interests
of creditors are known and can be appraised with relative ease. On
the other hand, § 363(f) solves problems less ably when the obliga-
tions of the debtor are unknown or when some creditors, such as tort
claimants, are not yet ascertainable. In fact, the cause of action for
some tort claimants does not arise until after the § 363 sale has been
approved. This creates a vexing problem-a problem for which the
Code does not provide a solution. This problem cannot be solved
without a thorough analysis of the Code, case law interpreting various
Code provisions, issues of state-law property rights, and the due pro-
cess rights afforded in the Constitution. The overlay is particularly
troublesome in the context of products liability cases because of suc-
cessor liability issues. Additionally, § 363 only permits a sale free and
clear of "interests in property"-a term not defined anywhere in the
Code. The various Circuit Courts of Appeal and their respective
lower courts have interpreted and applied the term interest in prop-
erty in conflicting ways.2 Finally, to the extent that an interest in
property exists, some courts are failing to provide adequate protection
of those interests as the Code requires.
This Article addresses two main issues: (1) what is an interest in
property for purposes of § 363(f), and (2) if successor liability creates
an interest in property, is it possible to have a sale free and clear of
successor liability without providing adequate protection of that inter-
est? This Article is primarily based on the Second Circuit's recent
opinion in In re Chrysler3 (Chrysler) and the Third Circuit's opinion in
In re Trans World Airlines (TWA). 4
1. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006).
2. See, e.g., In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 581 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting courts
have not settled upon the definition of "interest in such property"); see also In re Taylor, 198
B.R. 142, 161-62 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (discussing that courts differ in their definition of inter-
est); Rachel P. Corcoran, Why Successor Liability Claims Are Not "Interests in Property" Under
Section 363(f), 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 697, 757 (2010); Matthew T. Gunlock, Note, An
Appeal to Equity: Why Bankruptcy Courts Should Resort to Equitable Powers for Latitude in
Their Interpretation of "Interests" Under Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (stating that there has been much debate on what qualifies as an interest
under § 363(f)).
3. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
4. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003).
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY ISSUES WITHIN § 363(F)
I. WHAT IS AN INTEREST IN PROPERTY FOR
PURPOSES OF § 363(F)?
Section 363(f) allows a trustee to "sell property . .. free and clear of
any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate." 5 Sec-
tion 363(f) contains five prongs; only one prong, however, must be
satisfied to meet the requirements of § 363(f). 6 Unfortunately, the
language of § 363(f) does not define interest. In fact, the Code does
not provide a uniform definition of interest.
Though there is no clear definition of interest in the Code, all bank-
ruptcy courts uniformly agree that security interests and other liens
are interests under § 363(f). The courts disagree, however, on many
remaining issues related to interests in property with respect to
§ 363(f). Perhaps the narrowest view of interest is the view that only
an in rem interest may be affected by a sale free and clear under
§ 363(f). Although several courts use the Latin phrase in rem when
referring to the types of interests covered by § 363(f), there is no prac-
tical distinction between the phrases in rem and "interest in property,"
which is the precise language of § 363(f). The phrase in rem is used by
courts to refer to an interest that is inextricably tied to a specific, as-
certainable, and otherwise readily identifiable piece of property.
Black's Law Dictionary defines in rem as "against a thing."7
One court succinctly summarized the applicability of § 363 with re-
spect to tort claimants: "This section authorizes sales free and clear of
specific interests in the property being sold; liens, for example. Gen-
eral unsecured claimants including tort claimants, have no specific in-
terest in a debtor's property. Therefore, section 363 is inapplicable for
sales free and clear of such claims."8 This narrow view would make
§ 363 inapplicable to tort claims. In other words, a limited application
of in rem would not deprive tort victims of asserting a cause of action
after a § 363 sale.
Another court concluded that § 363(f) refers only to in rem inter-
ests that affect the property in question. That court reasoned that
§ 363(f) limits the interests that can be discharged to interests in such
property. 9 That court held that applying § 363(f) to interests other
than in rem interests would cause the "in such property" language to
5. § 363(f) (emphasis added).
6. See id.
7. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 864 (9th ed. 2009).
8. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (citation
omitted).
9. Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 917 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1995).
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be superfluous. 10 Read in the negative, this means that in personam-
against a person or entity-interests cannot be affected by a sale free
and clear because in personam interests are not interests against spe-
cific property.
Several courts have disagreed, sometimes strongly, with this inter-
pretation of § 363(f). Judge Fuentes, writing for the Third Circuit, ob-
served, "Some courts have narrowly interpreted interests in property
to mean in rem interests in property, such as liens. However, the
trend seems to be toward a more expansive reading of 'interests in
property' which 'encompasses other obligations that may flow from
ownership of the property."'' Other courts have held that an interest
in property is broader than a lien.12 Bankruptcy Judge Bostetter
noted:
Since "lien" is a defined term under the Bankruptcy Code, it stands
to reason that Congress would have used the term "lien" instead of
"interest," had it intended to restrict the scope of § 363(f) to liens.
Furthermore, § 363(f)(3) applies to situations in which "such inter-
est is a lien," which suggests that liens constitute a subcategory of
"any interest." Other courts have indicated that the term "interest"
is broad, covering more than mere liens.' 3
But concluding that interest is broader than a lien does not necessarily
mean interests extend to unsecured claims. It could, for example, ex-
tend only to ownership interests, such as those held by tenants in com-
mon or the partnership interest of a limited partner.
On the other hand, some courts have held that general unsecured
claims do not constitute interests within the meaning of § 363(f).14
Another court observed that while a few courts have held § 363(f)
applies only to in rem interests, numerous other courts have inter-
preted the statute more broadly, applying it, for example, to product
liability and employment discrimination claims.' 5 A proper analysis
of § 363(f) and an interpretation of interest, however, must apply the
bedrock principle that "in bankruptcy cases, the rule of decision for
the nature of rights and interests in property is furnished by state law
where no controlling federal law would govern."16
10. Id.
11. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
12. In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship, 262 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001).
13. In re WBQ P'ship, 189 BR. 97, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
14. In re Hutchinson, 5 F.3d 750, 756 (4th Cir. 1993).
15. Ninth Ave. Remedial Grp. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 731 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1996).
16. In re Eveleth Mines, LLC, 312 B.R. 634, 650 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2004).
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As is discussed further in this Article, whether a product liability or
employment discrimination claim is an interest in property has serious
ramifications for the parties involved as it relates to successor liability.
II. POLICY REASONS FOR § 363(F)
Section 363(f) is based on at least three public policy considerations
with respect to successor liability claims. The first public policy reason
is to induce potential buyers of assets that are currently subject to a
bankruptcy case to go forward with an asset purchase agreement by
providing finality to the asset sale. Second, the priority scheme of the
Code is designed to treat like claims in an equal manner. Third, the
value of the bankruptcy estate is maximized, which inures to the bene-
fit of all creditors, when a purchaser of assets under a § 363 sale is
shielded from all potential claims of any kind. In other words, a pur-
chaser of assets is willing to pay more for the assets if the assets are
not subject to potential claims of creditors.
The public policy considerations of § 363 were correctly stated by
the Southern District of New York in response to an appellant's argu-
ment that the court should modify a small provision in a § 363 sale
order. The court precisely and effectively illustrated the policy
considerations:
[W]e must leave the terms of sale undisturbed [to further] the policy
of finality in bankruptcy sales. Moreover, it assists bankruptcy
courts in maximizing the price for assets sold in such proceedings.
Otherwise, potential buyers would discount their offers to the detri-
ment of the bankruptcy's estate by taking into account the risk of
further litigation and the likelihood that the buyer will ultimately
lose the asset, together with any further investments or improve-
ments made in the asset.' 7
Addressing the merits of an appeal from the denial of a stay order,
that same court held that a reviewing court "may be powerless to
undo or rewrite the terms of the consummated sale" because this
"rule thus furthers the policy of finality in bankruptcy sales and assists
the bankruptcy court to secure the best price for the debtor's assets."' 8
Indeed, such a holding is consistent with the Second Circuit's Chrysler
opinion, which held that a plaintiff's tort claim against the purchaser
of a debtor corporation's assets at a § 363 sale was properly extin-
guished under § 363(f) because the plaintiff's claim was an otherwise
17. Parker v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 430 B.R. 65, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 932 F.2d 117, 123 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
18. Campbell v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43, 53
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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non-priority, unsecured claim.19 Moreover, allowing the plaintiff to
proceed with the claim would be inconsistent with the Code's priority
scheme.20 That same court explained that the basis for excluding tort
claims is grounded in the public policy considerations behind § 363(f):
[To the extent that the "free and clear" nature of the sale (as pro-
vided for in the Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") and § 363(f))
was a crucial inducement in the sale's successful transaction, it is
evident that the potential chilling effect of allowing a tort claim sub-
sequent to the sale would run counter to a core aim of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which is to maximize the value of the assets and
thereby maximize potential recovery to the creditors.21
This poses the question of whether it is reasonable to assume that a
potential purchaser would pay a higher price for the debtor's assets if
the risk of successor liability litigation was taken out of the equation.
If there is greater risk and uncertainty surrounding property of the
estate due to possible successor liability claims, might a potential
buyer offer a lower purchase price to account for the increased risk of
litigation? Of course, conventional business acumen and history un-
doubtedly suggest that this, in fact, would be the case. It is possible
that a successor liability claim directly against the subsequent pur-
chaser (via the seller) would have a so-called chilling effect on the
transaction. Not all courts, however, recognize the so-called chilling
effect that potential successor liability claims have on a bankruptcy
estate. In a case involving approximately $300,000 in delinquent pen-
sion fund claims, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, as dictum:
Of course, it is neither certain nor clear that the chilling effect need
give us pause: purchasers can demand a lower price to account for
pending liabilities of which they are aware, and under federal suc-
cessorship principles will not be held responsible for liabilities of
which they had no notice.22
19. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
20. Douglas v. Stamco, 363 F. App'x 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2010); see In re Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 292 (3d Cir. 2003) ("To allow the claimaints to assert successor liability
claims against [a purchaser] while limiting other creditors' recourse to the proceeds of the asset
sale would be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme.").
21. Douglas, 363 F. App'x at 102-03 (footnote omitted); see Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra
(In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 387 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that a sale pursuant to § 363 of the Code
"maximizes the purchase price of assets because without this assurance of finality, purchasers
could demand a large discount for investing in a property that is laden with the risk of endless
litigation as to who has rights to estate property").
22. Chi. Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v.
Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d 48, 50-51 (7th Cir. 1995).
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To be sure, the estate, debtor, and creditors all suffer when a pur-
chaser demands a lower price to account for pending or future
liabilities.
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 363(F)
How is a debtor supposed to sell property when multiple parties are
claiming an interest in the property? Section 363(f), which is written
in the disjunctive, contains the answer:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this
section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity
other than the estate, only if-
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property
free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is
to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on
such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable pro-
ceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.23
Section 363(f) permits a debtor to sell property to a successor who
can purchase the property with the assurance that a judicial order has
removed all claims, interests, and liens from the property. 24 If one or
more of the five criteria of § 363(f) are present, a judge may order
property to be sold free and clear of any interest, even without the
consent of secured creditors or other interested parties. Unsecured or
undersecured creditors, of course, are still entitled to a pro rata share
of the proceeds of the sale, but the subsequent purchaser of the prop-
erty or assets is shielded from successor liability claims. In fact, a
creditor generally may not sue the purchaser to recover losses against
the successor entity after a § 363 sale.
IV. WHEN CAN SUCCESSOR LIABILITY ARISE?
Successor liability, broadly defined, is a well-established legal prin-
ciple that can be used to extend liability, particularly in the context of
products liability, to a party that otherwise may not have been directly
connected to the harmful conduct alleged by a plaintiff. Although
products liability is arguably the most recognizable context for succes-
sor liability claims, other forms of successor liability, including matters
23. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006).
24. Id.
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related to environmental or labor claims, are also subject to § 363
sales.
Generally, a business that buys assets from a debtor ordinarily does
not acquire liability to the seller's creditors simply by buying its as-
sets.25 This maxim, however, has several notable exceptions. If a
buyer agrees to assume the seller's liability to third parties, it is, by
reason of its agreement, liable for successor liability claims.26 If a
court decides that a purchaser should be treated as a successor to the
transferor, it is liable for the transferor's debts as though they were its
own.27 There are three primary instances when a court will impose
successor liability on the acquirer despite its lack of consent. Succes-
sor liability can be imposed when an acquirer purchases assets and the
transaction "(1) amounts to a consolidation or merger (the de facto
merger basis); (2) the transferee is merely a continuation of the trans-
feror (the mere continuation basis); or (3) the transfer is entered into
fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts (the fraudulent
transfer basis)." 28
Naturally, a party that acquires assets from a debtor covets a judi-
cial order approving a sale under § 363. Such order, generally speak-
ing, prohibits third parties, known or unknown, from asserting
potentially costly successor liability claims against the acquirer. Fur-
thermore, an appeal from a § 363 sale confirmation order will very
likely be dismissed as moot, assuming that the purchaser acted in good
faith.29 After an asset is acquired, the sale's proceeds are typically
impounded subject to further court order until all claims against the
asset can be resolved. After the various claims are resolved, the court
will authorize a distribution to creditors. The Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Arizona accurately and succinctly summarized the pro-
cess of a § 363 sale: "Typically, the proceeds of sale are held subject to
the disputed interest and then distributed as dictated by the resolution
of the dispute; such procedure preserves all parties' rights by simply
transferring interests from property to dollars that represent its
value." 30 Once the property is unencumbered, the owner of the prop-
erty can finally realize the property's full potential without enduring
the inevitable delay, costs, and uncertainty of litigation.
25. See Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HorsrRA L. REv. 745 (2003).
26. In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Sys. Antitrust Litig., 724 F. Supp. 744, 753
(C.D. Cal. 1989).
27. Reilly, supra note 25, at 746.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. § 363(m).
30. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577, 590-91 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).
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V. IN RE TRANS WORLD AiRLINEs, INc.
Before analyzing the Second Circuit's opinion in Chrysler, it is im-
portant to first understand the Third Circuit's holding in TWA. 31 The
Second Circuit relied heavily on the Third Circuit's TWA opinion,
particularly with respect to the interest in property analysis relating to
successor liability. The disputed property interest in TWA was a
travel voucher program made available only to select current and for-
mer TWA employees (the Knox-Schillinger class) as part of a com-
prehensive settlement between the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and TWA. The settlement resolved a number
of sexual harassment claims against TWA management.
Although TWA admitted no wrongdoing, the settlement provided
that members of the Knox-Schillinger class would have the right to fly
a specific number of flights for free and receive a small cash payment.
The Third Circuit carefully analyzed whether the benefits provided
under the settlement amounted to an interest in property under § 363.
Reasoning that the benefits, while not property themselves, arose
from the property being sold, presumably TWA's airplanes, the Third
Circuit held that the benefits nevertheless were within the scope of
§ 363:
While the interests of the EEOC and the Knox-Schillinger class in
the assets of TWA's bankruptcy estate are not interests in property
in the sense that they are not in rem interests,... they are interests
in property within the meaning of section 363(f) in the sense that
they arise from the property being sold.32
To support its conclusion, the Third Circuit reasoned that limiting
interests in property to in rem interests was too narrow: "[T]o equate
interests in property with only in rem interests such as liens would be
inconsistent with section 363(f)(3), which contemplates that a lien is
but one type of interest."3 3 On this point, the court was correct; there
are, in fact, five situations in which the sale provisions of § 363(f)
apply.34
While correct that § 363 contemplates multiple variations of prop-
erty interests, the Third Circuit's reasoning was flawed because it
never explained how the interests of the Knox-Schillinger class de-
rived from the property being sold. The interests of the
Knox-Schillinger class stemmed from the actions, i.e. the sexual har-
assment, of TWA employees, particularly management personnel, and
31. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003).
32. Id. at 290.
33. Id.
34. § 363(f)(1)-(5).
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not from any particular piece of property.35 The interests of the
Knox-Schillinger class provided by the settlement agreement did not
arise from the property, i.e the airplanes, being sold.36 Indeed, if
TWA never filed bankruptcy and continued as a going concern, the
settlement would be funded from sales of airline tickets and not from
the sale of the airplanes themselves. More specifically, the
Knox-Schillinger class never received an interest in any specific or
readily identifiable piece of property.37 Unlike a secured creditor that
is entitled to the proceeds from the collateral's sale-subject to the
amount of its interest in the property-the Knox-Schillinger class was
not entitled to the proceeds of any specific piece of property. Ad-
dressing this precise issue, one commentator noted:
This fact, without more, does not imply that general unsecured
claims, such as successor liability claims, are also included within the
phrase "interest in property." Thus, without further explanation as
to why general unsecured successor liability claims constitute "inter-
ests in property" under section 363(f), the Third Circuit has
presented an unpersuasive argument.38
Although the Knox-Schillinger class did not have an interest in any
specific property, the Third Circuit effectively gave the
Knox-Schillinger class members an interest in the airplanes of
TWA-a feat of analytical gymnastics that allowed the Third Circuit
to hold that the flight attendants had interests in property that were
subject to a § 363 sale.
The Third Circuit, however, subsequently betrayed the flaw in its
own reasoning in its analysis of whether the same claims were subject
to monetary satisfaction: "Had TWA liquidated its assets under Chap-
ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the claims at issue would have been
converted to dollar amounts and the claimants would have received
the distribution provided to other general unsecured creditors on ac-
count of their claims."39 The Third Circuit concluded that in the event
of liquidation, the Knox-Schillinger class would be treated like "other
general unsecured creditors." 40 By definition, unsecured creditors do
not have an interest or claim against a specific piece of property. The
mere fact that the Knox-Schillinger class received a settlement enti-
tling its members to a specific number of free stand-by flights does not
mean that the class had an interest or claim to a particular seat on an
35. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d at 285.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 288-90.
38. Corcoran, supra note 2, at 732.
39. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d at 291 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
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airplane, the plane itself, or any tangible property of TWA. To hold
otherwise would either transform the Knox-Schillinger class members
into secured creditors or, at the very least, cause their claims to be
superior in priority compared to other general unsecured creditors.
VI. IN RE CHRYSLER LLC
One of the more public cases in recent years to address the relation-
ship between successor liability and a § 363 sale involved the car man-
ufacturer Chrysler.41 Chrysler fought many politically charged battles
(which are outside the scope of this Article) against secured creditors,
including the United Auto Workers Union (UAW) and the Indiana
State Police Pension Trust (the Indiana Pension Trust), in connection
with a proposed sale of its business assets to Fiat, an Italian car
manufacturer.
The Indiana Pension Trust, along with several other pension funds,
held both secured and unsecured claims against Chrysler. The Indi-
ana Pension Trust opposed Chrysler's proposed bankruptcy plan be-
cause, among other reasons, the Indiana Pension Trust would receive
a payout of only twenty-nine cents on the dollar, while unsecured
creditors, such as the UAW's health care trust, would receive a payout
of roughly fifty-five cents on the dollar.42 The Indiana Pension Trust
acquired claims from other secured creditors in July of 2008 for ap-
proximately forty-three cents on the dollar. Less than a year later,
however, the Indiana Pension Trust would face significant losses if
Chrysler was sold to Fiat.
Despite the fact that the Indiana Pension Trust, along with other
similarly situated creditors, had appointed an agent who affirmatively
consented to the bankruptcy plan proposed by Chrysler,43 the Indiana
Pension Trust later objected to Chrysler's bankruptcy plan. The Indi-
ana Pension Trust argued that the Chrysler bankruptcy plan was in-
consistent with the absolute priority rule44 of the Code because
unsecured creditors would receive a bankruptcy dividend while se-
cured creditors would not be made whole.
41. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
42. Whether such distribution violated the absolute priority rule and whether the unsecured
creditors, particularly the UAW, contributed sufficient new value to the bankruptcy plan to re-
ceive such a distribution are outside the scope of this Article.
43. It may be argued, perhaps even likely, that the Indiana Pension Trust did not have stand-
ing to object to the bankruptcy plan since it previously appointed an agent to act on its behalf.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2006).
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The Chrysler sale order raises several significant legal issues. Many
of the issues surround due process and notice requirements or involve
state law and successor liability. The scope of this Article, however, is
limited to the two main issues mentioned above: (1) what is an interest
in property for purposes of § 363(f), and (2) if successor liability is an
interest in property, is it possible to have a sale free and clear of suc-
cessor liability without providing adequate protection of that interest?
With respect to Chrysler, a proper analysis of the events that gave rise
to the sale order that permitted Old Chrysler to be sold free and clear
to New Chrysler under § 363 of the Code is particularly relevant.45
Much debate arises on that issue since there is not a uniform defini-
tion of interest in the Code. The fact that courts across the country
are split over its meaning only exacerbates the problem. The majority
of courts faced with the issue have interpreted interests in property to
include successor liability claims. Courts adopting the expansive view
of interests in property overlook an important implication of their in-
terpretation: if a successor liability claim constitutes an interest in
property under § 363(f), the holder of that claim is entitled to ade-
quate protection of that interest under § 363(e). 46
In Chrysler, the Second Circuit furthered the analysis and reasoning
of the Third Circuit's TWA opinion by concluding that "the term in-
terest in property encompasses those claims that arise from the prop-
erty being sold," and thus, the Second Circuit ordered the proposed
§ 363 sale free and clear of successor liability claims. 47 Although the
Chrysler opinion was later vacated because the Supreme Court
deemed the issues moot (while the petition for certiorari was pending,
the sale closed), the Second Circuit, in no uncertain terms, reiterated
its position that successor liability claims are interests in property
under § 363(f). Less than a month after the Supreme Court vacated
the Chrysler opinion, the Second Circuit's opinion in Douglas v.
Stamco48 was published. The Douglas case is particularly significant
because it specifically addressed an issue that the Second Circuit
evaded in the Chrysler case: Does a § 363 sale extinguish product lia-
45. For an in-depth and well-written analysis on this subject, see Corcoran, supra note 2.
46. Id. at 699 (requiring courts, upon request of an entity with an interest in property, to
prohibit or condition sale or use of property being sold by a trustee in order to adequately
protect interests in such property).
47. Id. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (agreeing that proposed successor liability
claims are interests in property because such rights are grounded in the property being sold, thus
concluding the sale was free and clear of those claims).
48. Douglas v. Stamco, 363 F. App'x 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing how underlying
public policy concerns disallowed plaintiff to proceed with a tort claim directly against the pur-
chaser because it would be inconsistent with the Code's priority scheme because plaintiff's claim
was a low-priority, unsecured claim).
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bility claims that have yet to occur? In Douglas, the § 363 sale took
place in 2001. Approximately four years after the § 363 sale took
place, but before the debtor's bankruptcy case closed, a plaintiff was
injured in an accident involving heavy machinery that was manufac-
tured by the seller prior to the § 363 sale. The plaintiff brought suit in
2008, approximately seven years after the § 363 sale occurred and ap-
proximately three years after the accident. The district court found in
favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff subsequently appealed to the
Second Circuit. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's find-
ing that successor liability did not exist.49 Much to the chagrin of
bankruptcy practitioners, the holding of the Second Circuit is embod-
ied in a summary order, which does not have precedential effect. The
lack of precedential effect notwithstanding, the order was cited by the
Southern District of New York in the General Motors bankruptcy
matter.50 Interestingly, the Second Circuit's subsequent decision in
Douglas relied entirely on policy considerations rather than an analy-
sis of the interests-in-property language of § 363(f).51
The Second Circuit relied on the Third Circuit's opinion in TWA, as
well as the Fourth Circuit's In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. opinion,52
to hold that claims arising from the property subject to sale may prop-
erly be considered interests in property.53 Therefore, such claims may
be subject to a § 363 sale.5 4 Curiously, this is in direct conflict with In
re White Motor. The In re White Motor court is one of a small number
of lower courts that has directly ruled on the issue of whether succes-
sor liability claims are interests in property under § 363(f).55 That
court concluded, "General unsecured claimants including tort claim-
ants, have no specific interest in a debtor's property. Therefore, sec-
tion 363 is inapplicable for sales free and clear of such claims."56 To
be sure, the In re White Motor opinion is not binding on the Second
Circuit. The Second Circuit, however, cited the In re White Motor
opinion as one of a large minority of cases that expressed divergent
views on what is an interest in property.57 Unfortunately, the Second
49. Id. at 103.
50. Campbell v. Motors Liquidation Co. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 428 B.R. 43, 49-50
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
51. See Corcoran, supra note 2.
52. In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996).
53. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
54. Id. at 126.
55. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
56. Id. at 948.
57. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 124 n.16.
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Circuit's analysis and subsequent rejection of the reasoning used in In
re White Motor was perfunctory to say the least.
Other lower courts agree that successor liability claims do not con-
stitute interests in property.58 Interestingly enough, the In re White
Motor court, despite concluding that successor liability claims are not
interests in property, ordered the sale free and clear of successor lia-
bility on public policy grounds. 59 The Second Circuit's Chrysler opin-
ion, however, is fundamentally flawed because current and future tort
claimants asserting successor liability claims do not have an interest in
property within the meaning of § 363(f). An interest in property must
exist in order for a court to order a sale pursuant to § 363(f). 60 As-
suming, arguendo, that current and future tort claimants did have an
interest in property within the meaning of § 363(f), the Chrysler Sale
Order did not provide adequate protection for those interests. Conse-
quently, the Sale Order did not comply with the Code's mandatory
requirements when dealing with interests in property.
VII. THE SECOND AND THIRD CIRCUITS APPLIED THE WRONG
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Second Circuit's Chrysler opinion is deficient to the extent it
held that future tort claimants, who are currently unknown and cannot
receive notice that their claims will be extinguished under a § 363 sale,
have an interest in property. The Second Circuit opinion delves into
an analysis of claims and whether future tort claims are unsecured
claims against Old Chrysler. The Second Circuit, however, applied
the wrong analytical framework. The Second Circuit focused on
claims against the debtor (Old Chrysler), but the value of successor
liability is the claim against the successor (New Chrysler). In other
words, the value of such a successor liability claim is against the buyer,
not the seller.
The Second Circuit's analysis in Chrysler misses the point entirely
insofar as successor liability is concerned. Furthermore, the opinion is
58. Corcoran, supra note 2; see Mickowski v. Visi-Trak Worldwide, LLC, 321 F. Supp. 2d 878,
883 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (footnote omitted) ("[A] sale of assets under § 363(f) is free and clear of
secured claims only. It does not extend to unsecured creditors."); R.C.M. Exec. Gallery Corp. v.
Rols Capital Co., 901 F. Supp. 630, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[T]here is no federal preemption of
state law successor liability merely because the sale of assets occurred in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing."); Schwinn Cycling & Fitness, Inc. v. Benonis (In re Schwinn Bicycle Co.), 210 B.R. 747, 761
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) ("[Section 363(f)] and its invocation in the sale order in no way protects
the buyer from current or future product liability; it only protects the purchased assets from lien
claims against those assets.").
59. In re White Motor Credit Corp., 75 B.R. at 948.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006).
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seriously limited in its application because the analysis is an assess-
ment of Old Chrysler. The correct analysis requires an assessment of
New Chrysler, the successor. The analysis regarding successor liability
claims as unsecured claims or arguments about successor liability
claims potentially violating the Code's priority scheme are simply ir-
relevant. Claims against Old Chrysler were worthless, and the Second
Circuit recognized this fact. The Second Circuit noted, "[I]t is undis-
puted that little or no money will be available for damages even if
suits against Old Chrysler succeed." 6' The Second Circuit simply ap-
plied the wrong analysis. The Second Circuit needed to decide if an
unknown number of unidentifiable future tort claimants-who them-
selves may not know that they will have claims in the future-have an
interest in property that is subject to the provisions of § 363 or, in the
alternative, if such future tort claimants can assert claims against New
Chrysler, not Old Chrysler. Furthermore, future tort claimants can-
not, as a practical reality, have a claim against either Old Chrysler or
New Chrysler because they have yet to suffer an injury or other harm.
Indeed, it would be nonsensical to say that, at the time of the § 363
sale, a purchaser of a Chrysler vehicle manufactured before the bank-
ruptcy petition was filed and who will suffer an injury at some unde-
termined time post-confirmation has an interest in property or claim
against Chrysler. Such a hypothetical tort claimant does not have
standing. As noted earlier, there are serious constitutional issues, spe-
cifically due process issues, implicated by such a holding. Indeed,
these constitutional concerns are properly analyzed and explained by
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in its In
re Grumman opinion. 62
Even if the Second Circuit applied the correct analytical framework
and concluded that future tort claimants have interests in property
that were subject to § 363, the Second Circuit's holding still violates
the Code because the Second Circuit did not adequately protect such
interests in property. The Second Circuit reasoned that future claim-
ants would not receive a distribution from Old Chrysler and that ade-
quate protection was therefore not required (courts usually look to
see what such claims would be worth in a Chapter 7 liquidation). 63
The reasoning of the Second Circuit, however, is unpersuasive as
much as it is incorrect for the reasons stated above. More specifically,
the value of the successor liability claim is not what would be received
61. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 123 n.15.
62. In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 445 B.R. 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 467 B.R.
694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
63. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 124-27.
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from Old Chrysler, but what would be received from New Chrysler.
Despite the inconsistent holdings of various courts regarding the defi-
nition of interest in property with respect to § 363, there is at least one
court that fully appreciates the ramifications of the TWA and Chrysler
cases and their respective ancestors and future progeny.
In October of 2009, John and Denise Frederico filed a personal in-
jury action against Morgan Olson, LLC (Morgan) in New Jersey.64
The Fredericos commenced an adversary proceeding in the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York because Morgan
purchased the assets of Grumman Olson Industries Inc. (Grumman)
in a § 363 sale order after Grumman filed for protection under the
Code.65 It is well settled that a bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction to
interpret and enforce its prior orders, especially where the bankruptcy
court expressly retained jurisdiction to do So. 66
Mrs. Frederico was an employee of Federal Express and was criti-
cally injured in the fall of 2009 when her Federal Express truck col-
lided with a telephone pole. The Federal Express truck was
manufactured, at least in part, by Grumman in 1994-well before the
bankruptcy petition was filed and long before the § 363 sale order was
entered-and, apparently, was defective for several reasons. The
Fredericos claimed that because the truck was produced and sold
before the bankruptcy sale, a sale order under § 363 should not permit
Morgan to escape liability for being a successor. The court was faced
with a straightforward, threshold legal question: Does the sale order
exonerate Morgan from liability to the Fredericos? 67 Much like a po-
tential future tort claimant that suffered injuries as a result of a car
manufactured by Chrysler would argue, the Fredericos' based their
claim of successor liability on the fact that Morgan continued the same
product line after the purchase, traded upon and benefitted from the
goodwill of the product line, held itself out to potential customers as
continuing to manufacture the same product line of Grumman trucks,
and continued to market the line of trucks to Federal Express.68
To illustrate the importance of the issues surrounding future tort
claimants who are injured after the consummation of a § 363 sale by a
defective product manufactured and sold by a debtor prior to the
bankruptcy, the Second Circuit suggested the following hypothetical
in 1991:
64. In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 445 B.R. at 247.
65. Id.
66. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 151 (2009).
67. In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 445 B.R. at 247.
68. Id. at 250.
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Consider, for example, a company that builds bridges around the
world. It can estimate that of 10,000 bridges it builds, one will fail,
causing 10 deaths. Having built 10,000 bridges, it becomes insolvent
and files a petition in bankruptcy. Is there a "claim" on behalf of
the 10 people who will be killed when they drive across the one
bridge that will fail someday in the future? If the only test is
whether the ultimate right to payment will arise out of the debtor's
pre-petition conduct, the future victims have a "claim." Yet it must
be obvious that enormous practical and perhaps constitutional
problems would arise from recognition of such a claim. The poten-
tial victims are not only unidentified, but there is no way to identify
them. Sheer fortuity will determine who will be on that one bridge
when it crashes. What notice is to be given to these potential
"claimants"? Or would it suffice to designate a representative for
future victims and authorize the representative to negotiate terms of
a binding reorganization plan? 6 9
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's hypothetical has become a
stark reality for some tort claimants. To be sure, it will soon become a
reality for plaintiffs injured by Chrysler vehicles manufactured before
the bankruptcy sale but whose injuries occurred after the § 363 sale.
The Fredericos' right to payment falls squarely within the above hypo-
thetical. It represents "the extreme case of pre-petition conduct that
has not yet resulted in any tortious consequences to a victim." 70
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York con-
cluded that the § 363 sale order did not affect the rights of the Freder-
icos to sue Morgan under a theory of successor liability.7 ' The court
noted:
Except for Chrysler, . .. every case that we have found addressing
this issue has concluded for reasons of practicality or due process, or
both, that a person injured after the sale (or confirmation) by a de-
fective product manufactured and sold prior to the bankruptcy does
not hold a "claim" in the bankruptcy case and is not affected by
either the § 363(f) sale order or the discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141(d). 72
69. United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991).
70. In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 445 B.R. at 253.
71. Id. at 254.
72. Id.; see, e.g., Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1994) (observ-
ing that the definition of "claims" cannot be extended to cover future tort claimants who "were
completely unknown and unidentified at the time [the debtor] filed its petition and whose rights
depended entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences"); Schwinn Cycling & Fitness, Inc. v.
Benonis, 217 B.R. 790, 797 (N.D. 111. 1997) (holding that due process prevented discharge of a
claim against a purchaser of the debtor's assets arising from post-sale, post-confirmation injury
because claimants "had no notice, and no reason at the time, to present an interest in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings or to take action in response to the threatened deprivation of their rights");
Taylor v. Strongbuilt Int'l, Inc. (In re Strongbuilt Inc.), No. 03-31317, 2009 WL 5873047, at *3
(Bankr. W.D. La. Aug. 26, 2009) (holding that the plan did not discharge the claim against
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Fortunately for future tort claimants, Judge Bernstein's In re Grum-
man opinion refused to extend the reach of the bankruptcy court's
§ 363 sale order.73 This decision effectively made an acquirer of a
debtor liable for products produced by the debtor prior to the filing of
the debtor's bankruptcy petition when such products cause an injury
post-confirmation. In other words, if a debtor manufacturers a prod-
uct prior to the bankruptcy, and if that same product causes an injury
to a person or group of persons that had no legal way of asserting its
claim during the bankruptcy proceedings, successor liability will apply
to the subsequent purchaser of the debtor and its assets, even when a
sale order provides otherwise. The relevant language from the Sec-
ond Circuit's Chrysler opinion is as follows: "[W]e decline to delineate
the scope of the bankruptcy court's authority to extinguish future
claims, until such time as we are presented with an actual claim for an
injury that is caused by Old Chrysler, that occurs after the Sale, and
that is cognizable under state successor liability law." 74
Some courts have concluded that current and future tort claimants
have in personam claims against a debtor. This conclusion, however,
applies the wrong analytical framework. As noted earlier, the value of
a successor liability claim is against the subsequent purchaser, not the
seller. The TWA court, for example, held that the claims of the
debtor's successor for post-confirmation injury caused by a product the debtor manufactured
pre-petition because "[t]o hold otherwise, would be to require the plaintiffs to presume an acci-
dent and estimate the cost of the damages of an injury that had not yet occurred and to have
filed that claim"); White v. Chance Indus., Inc. (In re Chance Indus., Inc.), 367 B.R. 689, 709
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (holding that confirmation discharge did not affect rights of a party in-
jured post-confirmation on an amusement park ride manufactured by the debtor pre-petition
where the debtor failed to give any notice of its intent to discharge future claims and failed to
provide for a future claims representative or establish a fund to pay their claims); In re Hoffinger
Indus., Inc., 307 B.R. 112, 114, 122 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2004) (declining to estimate the claims of
people who will suffer future injuries resulting from swimming pools and associated products
manufactured by the debtor pre-petition because "[tihe post confirmation person unknown, un-
born, or about to take their first swimming lesson simply does not have a logical prepetition
nexus to Hoffinger's products. Due process demands more . . ."); In re Kewanee Boiler Corp.,
198 B.R. 519, 540-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that a party injured in a post-confirmation
boiler room accident as a result of alleged defects in a boiler manufactured by the debtor pre-
petition was not bound by discharge because he did not have a "right to payment," but even if he
did, persons who might be injured in the future "could not be identified with enough specificity
to allow them to be notified," the "[d]ischarge of their future claims would violate the Fifth
Amendment because of fairness and due process concerns and would also violate bankruptcy
notice requirements," and the debtor did not seek the appointment of a future-tort-claimants
representative or establish a fund to pay their claims); Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the
Unknown Future Claim in Bankruptcy-Is This Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J.
339 (2004).
73. In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 445 B.R. at 255-56.
74. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 127 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police
Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
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Knox-Schillinger class were in personam claims against TWA despite
the fact that such claims were not traceable or linked to any specific
property or asset. The Third Circuit, however, amorphously con-
nected the claims of the Knox-Schillinger class to the aircraft of TWA
by noting that "the term any interest is intended to refer to obligations
that are connected to, or arise from, the property being sold."75 In a
blistering opinion by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minne-
sota that declined to follow the reasoning put forth by the Third and
Fourth Circuits, Chief Judge Kishel stated:
The TWA court, however, does not overtly pass on the question of
whether successor liability on account of the travel-voucher claims
would have lodged against a purchaser of the debtor's assets, let
alone whether the incipience of successor liability, figuratively float-
ing over its debtor, somehow could have become choate and then
attached to the transferred assets upon a sale. 76
Inexplicably, the Third Circuit did not cite a scintilla of legal author-
ity, statutory or otherwise, that would impose successor liability on a
purchaser. In fact, the Third Circuit noted, "The Bankruptcy Court
determined that there was no basis for successor liability on the part
of American and that the flight attendants' claims could be treated as
unsecured claims. In keeping with the Bankruptcy Court's conclu-
sions, the Sale Order extinguished successor liability on the part of
American . ... "77 Even if the Third Circuit believed that American
Airlines' purchase of substantially all of TWA's assets was a mere con-
tinuation of the debtor and subject to successor liability, as noted
above, the reasoning of the Third Circuit still fails because the proper
starting point for determining what constitutes an interest is a matter
of state law, unless controlling federal law exists.78 As mentioned
above, this is a hallmark principle of determining the scope of an
interest.
VIII. INTERESTS IN PROPERTY MUST BE ADEQUATELY
PROTECTED
Even if the Second Circuit was correct that the unascertainable fu-
ture tort claimants, whose injuries have not yet occurred, have inter-
ests in property that may be sold free and clear, the court improperly
authorized the § 363 sale because it failed to adequately protect the
75. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Folger Adam
Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
76. In re Eveleth Mines, LLC, 312 B.R. 634, 654 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2004).
77. In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d at 286.
78. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 52-56 (1979).
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interests of the future tort claimants. The Code is clear; if adequate
protection cannot be provided, a § 363 sale must be prohibited.79 The
court did not provide adequate protection to future tort claimants de-
spite the mandatory provisions of § 363(e); therefore, the Second Cir-
cuit improperly applied the Code's provision to the issues in Chrysler.
At the very least, New Chrysler should not have been able to purchase
the assets of Old Chrysler free and clear, at least with respect to the
future tort claims.
The Code requires a court to provide adequate protection of an in-
terest in property when such property will be sold free and clear of an
interest.80 Section 363(e) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on
request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or
leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the
court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such
use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of
such interest. This subsection also applies to property that is subject
to any unexpired lease of personal property (to the exclusion of
such property being subject to an order to grant relief from the stay
under section 362).81
Adequate protection is defined by the Code in § 361.82 Whenever
adequate protection is required under § 362, § 363, or § 364, an inter-
est in property must be adequately protected in one of the following
manners:
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash
payments to such entity, to the extent that the stay under sec-
tion 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this
title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title results
in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to
the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a
decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to
compensation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as
an administrative expense, as will result in the realization by
such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's inter-
est in such property.83
79. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006).
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. § 361.
83. Id.
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In a well-known case involving both economic and noneconomic
interests of the National Hockey League (NHL) and its contract with
the Phoenix Coyotes, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Ari-
zona highlighted and discussed the mandatory requirements that the
Code imposes when a § 363 sale is proposed. Section 363(e) requires
the court "to provide adequate protection" of any interest in the prop-
erty that is being sold free and clear." That subsection expressly
states, in mandatory and unambiguous language, that the court "shall
prohibit or condition" the proposed sale "as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest."85 The court held that the bid
provided by PSE Sports and Entertainment LP (PSE) to purchase the
Pheonix Coyotes and relocate them to Hamilton, Ontario must be de-
nied with prejudice because the interests of the NHL could not be
adequately protected as required by § 363(e) if the sale to PSE were
approved. 86
Judge Baum, writing for the Bankruptcy Court of Arizona, strug-
gled to find a method or means that would adequately protect the
NHL's noneconomic interests.87 Because the court believed that the
NHL's noneconomic interests could not be adequately protected, the
court held that it was powerless, by the clear and mandatory language
of § 363, to effectuate a sale to PSE.8 8 Indeed, if adequate protection
cannot be provided, the sale must be prohibited.89
Judge Baum's analysis is correct; this analysis, if followed by the
Second Circuit in Chrysler, would have produced a diametrically dif-
ferent result. Even assuming the claims asserted against Chrysler by
current and future tort claimants were interests in property, the lack
of the ability to fashion adequate protection of those interests neces-
sarily means the proposed sale could not be approved. Thus, if ade-
quate protection cannot be provided with respect to an interest in
property, the plain language of the Code prohibits a § 363 sale.
Regarding Chrysler, it is crucial to note that neither the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York nor the Second Circuit
addressed the adequate protection issue. Perhaps even more perplex-
ing is that the attorneys representing the current and future tort claim-
ants did not raise the issue of adequate protection, which, based on a
strict reading of the Code language, arguably excuses both courts' fail-
84. § 363(e).
85. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577, 592 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009).
86. Id. at 593.
87. Id. at 591.
88. Id. at 592.
89. Id.
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ure to address the adequate protection requirement. The Code states,
"on request of an entity that has an interest in property ... the court,
with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or
lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such
interest." 90
Because there was not one party with an interest in property that
requested the court to condition the sale by providing adequate pro-
tection, it is arguable that neither court was obligated to address this
major omission on the part of the lawyers for the current and future
tort claimants.
When requested by a party in interest, however, adequate protec-
tion is mandatory.91 As one commentator aptly noted, "[S]ection
363(e) would potentially grant general unsecured successor liability
claimants enhanced treatment compared to similarly situated non-pri-
ority creditors, essentially turning on its head the argument that per-
mitting imposition of successor liability claims against section 363(f)
purchasers would upset Code priorities." 92
Further addressing § 363(e)'s impact on unsecured creditors, Judge
Leif M. Clark, writing for the Bankruptcy Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas, observed:
[I]f unsecured creditors had an "interest in property" sufficiently
cognizable that a special provision is required to achieve a sale "free
and clear," then those selfsame creditors should also be entitled to
adequate protection of those interests during the pendency of the
case. But that notion too essentially renders the distinctions drawn
in the Code a nullity.93
If current and future tort claimants are truly unsecured creditors
because they do not have claims against specific, readily ascertainable
property of the debtor, an argument could be made that such tort
claimants have in personam claims against the debtor. On the topic of
in personam claims and how such claims might eventually become in-
terests in the estate, Judge Clark said:
90. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
91. Corcoran, supra note 2, at 755; see In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. at 592
("The requirement of adequate protection in Section 363(e) is mandatory. If adequate protec-
tion cannot be provided, such sale must be prohibited."); In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.,
290 B.R. 487, 491 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing adequate protection as mandatory and
not discretionary when requested by a secured entity); In re Heatron, Inc., 6 B.R. 493, 494
(Bankr. Mo. 1980) (noting that adequate protection is mandatory when requested by entities
with property interests, but its form and sufficiency is developed by the trustee).
92. Corcoran, supra note 2, at 755 (footnote omitted) (noting an entity with an interest in
property may request adequate protection if such property is to be sold, used, or leased).
93. Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 918
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995).
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[Tihe argument unnecessarily (and perhaps impermissibly) blurs the
distinction between secured and unsecured creditors' interests in
the estate. Even though all creditors have an interest in the estate,
they do not have the interest in property that would be cognizable
under 506(a) for example. Otherwise, the distinctions drawn there
between secured and unsecured claims would be all but
obliterated.94
Judge Clark felt so strongly about his position that he quipped, "No
one can seriously argue that in personam claims have, of themselves,
an interest in such property."95 Unfortunately, several courts, includ-
ing the Second and Third Circuits, have disregarded Judge Clark's
reasoning and strict construction of the Code with respect to successor
liability issues.
Assuming future tort claimants have general unsecured claims,
Judge Clark believes that such claims cannot be interests in property
because such treatment would violate the Code's priority scheme of
equality among similarly situated creditors.96 Indeed, successor liabil-
ity claimants with interests in property face a zero-sum game; one
creditor or class of creditors must suffer for another class to benefit.
Assuming that tort claimants possess in personam claims, at least
one court has held that § 363 sales that purport to absolve the succes-
sor of in personam claims are not absolute. In fact, In re Grumman
was concerned with this very issue-To what extent may a bankruptcy
court provide in personam relief to a buyer under § 363(f)? The court
held that "§ 363(f) authorizes the Court to absolve the buyer of in
personam liability for pre-confirmation claims in a chapter 11 case." 97
Of particular interest is that the In re Grumman opinion specifically
mentions the Second Circuit's Douglas opinion and tries to limit and
apply that case's holding narrowly.98 The Second Circuit, however,
gave no indication that the holding was to be construed narrowly.
More specifically, the In re Grumman court stated:
Given ... the caution expressed by the Second Circuit in Chrysler,
Douglas v. Stamco cannot be read to support [the successor's] over-
arching argument that a sale order under § 363(f) can exonerate a
purchaser from in personam liability for future torts where the fu-
ture victim had no meaningful opportunity to participate in the
bankruptcy or prosecute his claim.99
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc., 445 B.R. 243, 255 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 467
B.R. 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
98. Id. at 256 n.10.
99. Id.
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It is critical to note the timeline of the Chrysler and Douglas deci-
sions. Chrysler was decided before Douglas, and the In re Grumman
opinion, as noted above, was later vacated by the Supreme Court as
moot. Douglas presented similar facts to Chrysler and was decided
after the Second Circuit's Chrysler opinion was deemed moot-the
Second Circuit clearly reaffirmed its position in Chrysler with its opin-
ion in Douglas. Such a timeline of events draws into question the be-
lief of the In re Grumman court that Douglas must be read with a
limited, focused, and otherwise narrow holding.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although several district and circuit courts have examined the is-
sues of successor liability in the context of § 363 sales, the overwhelm-
ing majority of courts that have examined the issues are failing to
apply a proper analysis. There are at least two major errors that
courts have consistently made when analyzing potential successor lia-
bility claims and § 363 sales. First, a court must determine whether
the interest that is being sold free and clear is an interest in such prop-
erty as used in § 363(f). If a court determines that the interest in ques-
tion is the type of interest intended by Congress in § 363(f), a court
must then adequately protect such interest pursuant to the unambigu-
ous and mandatory language of § 363(e). A court is not permitted to
authorize a sale free and clear of an interest in property if adequate
protection cannot be provided. Additionally, a court may authorize
only a sale free and clear of an interest in property-a court cannot
sell free and clear of all possible interests that may exist. In fact, a
court must adequately protect every interest that is stripped from the
property being sold.
Perhaps the more critical error that courts commit when analyzing
successor liability claims in the context of § 363 sales is the belief that
the value of successor liability is against the original debtor. For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit incorrectly focused on creditors receiving a
distribution from Old Chrysler. To be sure, the value of successor lia-
bility claims is against the purchaser or newly reorganized debtor, not
against the defunct debtor. The value is the ability of future tort
claimants to seek monetary damages against the solvent successor.
The Second Circuit should have analyzed whether the current and
future tort claimants had an interest in property under § 363(f), and it
is likely that the analysis would be totally different for current tort
claimants and future tort claimants. If such an interest existed, then
the Second Circuit should have provided adequate protection for
those interests. Nevertheless, the entity that should have been the fo-
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cus of successor liability is New Chrysler, not Old Chrysler. Everyone
agrees that Old Chrysler had little or no money to pay unsecured
creditors, but tort claimants, particularly future tort claimants, present
unique challenges to a court and cannot be simply labeled as un-
secured creditors. As a practical reality, future tort claimants cannot
have a claim against Old Chrysler, or any entity for that matter, until
their injuries occur. Whether a bankruptcy court can eliminate succes-
sor liability, which is purely a nonbankruptcy, state-law issue, through
§ 363 sales is an issue that requires a much different analysis than
most courts have conducted when presented with such issues.
Congress is clearly aware of the problem that future tort claimants
face as evidenced by § 524(g) and its protection afforded to victims of
asbestos injuries,1 0 but Congress has yet to expand the powers of the
Code to deal with other types of future tort claimants, such as those
injured by Chrysler vehicles. Furthermore, a channeling injunction or
special litigation trust could be created to manage the unique
problems associated with successor liability and personal injury vic-
tims. On the other hand, perhaps the bigger problem lies in the fact
that the majority of courts analyzing successor liability claims and fu-
ture tort claimants is not properly applying the principles of the Code.
Indeed, a proper interpretation and analysis of the current Code lan-
guage, and not congressional intervention, appears to be the better
solution.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006).
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